BUHARI'S RIVERS OF
RIGGING FOR OIL Part 3biii
THE FOUR WITNESS ACCOUNT OF NORTHERN VITAL INTEREST
DODAN BARRACKS: THE HOT SEAT OF "IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN
POWER" THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE KADUNA MAFIA FOR INDIRECT RULE
(Corrected, updated, Rearranged and Republished edition)
(By Amaso Jack)
"Dodan Barracks'. It is named after a town called Dodan
in the Arakan peninsula in Burma where Nigerians fought, back in World War
2."
Nowa Omoigui
(Operation Aure (2): Planning to Overthrow General Ironsi)
....It is important to understand the history of the power
structure in Nigeria as the basis for a better understanding of the rigging
that took place in Port Harcourt and more importantly, WHY!
This background is necessary for understanding how
Government House Port Harcourt would have been another "symbolic"
Dodan Barracks, as it was to Gowon, Murtala, Shagari, Buhari and Babangida.
BACKGROUND OF DODAN BARRACKS
Dodan Barracks, Ikoyi, like Arakan Barracks Apapa, owe their
names to those places where African forces fought in Burma, present day Mayama,
during World War 2. Arakan is a name common to military facilities Nigeria,
Ghana and Zambia.
Nowa Omoigui in his comprehensive work: "Barracks: The
History behind those names PARTS 1 & 2" wrote:
"Those named after military battles or campaigns or
memorable locations or cultural symbols of specific military theaters of war.
Examples include Bonny Camp, Abalti, Dodan, An, Myohaung, Arakan, Tego, Beho
Beho, Marda, and Ashanti Barracks in Lagos; Letmauk Barracks in
Ibadan;" https://dawodu.com/barrack4.htm
In Ghana, he added:
-"Within Burma camp, there are Barracks - such as the
Arakan Barracks, named after the Arakan campaign in Burma. (Interestingly, the
Zambia National Defense Headquarters in Lusaka is located in an Army Base that
is also called 'Arakan Barracks' - and Nigeria has an Arakan Barracks as
well.)"
https://www.dawodu.com/barrack3.htm
-"The 82nd (West Africa) Division was formed under
British control during World War II…It....was disbanded in Burma between May
and September 1946….The inspiration for the division's formation came from
General George Giffard….After further training, the division took part in the
third Arakan campaign in December 1944 under Indian XV Corps." https://en.m.wikipedia.org/…/82nd_%28West_Africa%29_Divisio…
DODAN BARRACKS: THE HOT SEAT OF "IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN
POWER"
It was the place where Gowon was in office but not in power.
The Nigerian military historian, Max Siollun made the point
on the 127 page of his Algora book published in New York, he titled: "Oil,
Politics and Violence Nigeria's Military Coup Culture (1966-1976)" , in
which he wrote:
"Despite Gowon becoming head of State, Lt-Colonel
Murtala Muhammed remained the power behind the throne. As Gowon tried to
consolidate his political leadership of the country, Murtala lurked in the
background as the army's de facto strongman. He made a nuisance of himself by
turning up uninvited at SMC meetings. Tension between the two men was far beneath
the surface, and it simmered between them for a decade"
Analysis. SMC stands for Supreme Military Council. It was
the military "legislature" during the years of military rule, that
met in Dodan Barracks.
STRATEGIC QUESTION: If Biokpomabo Awara, of African Action
Congress (AAC) had won the state elections in Port Harcourt, would Rotimi
Amaechi conduct himself to Awara, the way Murtala did to Gowon?
Observation: Murtala like Amaechi was the rallying point,
that Awara like Gowon benefited from.
There is no better illustration of "IN OFFICE BUT NOT
IN POWER", than Murtala's insubordination to Gowon, right there in the
council chambers of the SMC, at the crucial and critical time of their seating!
Olufemi Ogunsanwo on the 107th page of his 2009 Pace
published biography, titled: "General Yakubu Gowon The Supreme
Commander" deployed the literary beauty of Frederick Forsythe to make the
point.
"Gowon was 'brushed off the throne like a fly off the
dressing table"
OGUNDIPE: THE FIRST OFFICER VICTIM OF "IN OFFICE BUT
NOT IN POWER"
Dodan barracks and those associated with it, are synonymous
with "in office but not in power".
The first and by far the worst example of in office but not
in power, occurred between July 29 and 30. It involved a sergeant from the
Federal Guards, Dodan Barracks. It was the venue where Murtala Muhammed made
the point by walking into the meetings of the Supreme Military Council.
"About this time, first Major Johnson and then
Brigadier Ogundipe himself gave an order to a northern NCO deployed to the
Federal Guards Company. The soldier blatantly said he would not take
orders" Nowa Omoigui http://www.gamji.com/nowa/nowa26.htm.
Nigerian military historian Max Siollun, captured it this
way, on the 122nd page of his 2009, New York published Algora book, he titled:
"Oil, Politics and Violence Nigeria's Military Coup
Culture (1966-1976)
"In a much publicized incident, the 'limit' came for
the Brigadier when a Northern sergeant quipped to him: "I do not take
orders from you until my (Northern) captain comes." The captain to whom
the sergeant was referring was Captain Joe Garba. To a seasoned professional
soldier like Ogundipe (accustomed to unquestioning obedience of his orders
during a military career spanning over twenty years), such insubordination was
beyond comprehension.
A Northern private similarly refused to obey orders from
Major Mobolaji Johnson, the Lagos military governor. Three junior Northern
soldiers working under the Igbo GSO (Grade I) at army headquarters Lt-Colonel
Patrick Anwunah refused to carry out Instructions given to them by Anwunah.
Anwunah walked out from his office in disgust and never
returned. In Anwunah's career, that was the first time his orders had been
disobeyed, and it turned out to be the last order that Anwunah ever gave as a
Nigerian army officer."
"IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN POWER" A POLICY? FROM
CAPTAIN JOE GARBA TO CAPTAIN TOLOFARI
"Captain Tolofari, a very brilliant officer was even
insulted by his junior and when he punished the officer, he was transferred to
a smaller unit meant for someone lower than him. The northern officers were so
undisciplined that they had the right to disobey superiors and nothing could
happen, as long as that superior is not northern. Their attitude gave them the
nickname ‘’Junior AFRC’’ A term that was taken from Armed Forces Ruling
Council. To show their power."
NOWA OMOIGUI'S THREE PORTRAITS OF MURTALA MOHAMMED: THE
CONTEMPORARY ARCHITECT OF "IN OFFICE BUT NOT IN POWER"?
From an article he titled:
.....in which he had three significant entries:
(1st Entry) "September 21, 1967, Lt. Col. Murtala
Mohammed made the following radio broadcast:"
"On behalf of the head of the Federal Military
Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, I appoint Lt.-Col.
Samuel Ogbemudia as the temporary administrator of the Mid-Western State of
Nigeria"
Max Siollun, (the Nigerian military historian) provided
supporting evidence on the 163rd page, of his in New York published Algora
book, he titled:
"Oil, Politics and Violence Nigeria's Military Coup
Culture (1966-1976)", this way:
"After recapturing the Mid-West, Murtala installed
Major Samuel Ogbemudia as its new Military governor without seeking or
obtaining Gowon's approval for the appointment. Nonetheless Ogbemudia remained
in that post for a further eight years until he was removed by Murtala"
(2nd Entry) "Against instructions from Supreme
Headquarters, and faced with disobedience from two of his brigade commanders
(Lt. Cols. Aisida and Akinrinade), followed by a near fist-fight with a fellow
divisional commander (Col. Shuwa), Murtala Mohammed then tried repeatedly to
conduct an assault river crossing by taking Onitsha frontally from Asaba. He
lost thousands of men and millions of dollars of supplies in three carelessly
planned attempts. At least one of these attempts was made on the advice of
marabouts."
(3rd Entry) "...he suffered one more humiliating loss
at Abagana on March 31st 1968, when Biafran troops ambushed a logistics
column....It is alleged that after the Abagana debacle, Mohammed simply went to
Kano and then left the country on vacation to London without bothering to
inform Supreme HQ. He was, however, promoted to Colonel in 1968 and reappointed
to the Inspectorate of Signals."
THE NATION ON ABAGANA:
"THE ABAGANA AMBUSH: March 25, 1968 ...... It was the
day the Nigerian side suffered the heaviest single loss in the war. Known as
the Abagana Ambush, the Second Division of the Nigerian Army led by Col.
Murtala Muhammed had ....... been repelled by the Col. Joe Achuzia’s guerrilla
army and suffering heavy casualties). Having crossed into Biafra, the plan was
to link up with the First Division led by Col. Shuwa....... Col. Muhammed was
said to have assembled and deployed, a convoy of 96 vehicles and four armoured
cars to facilitate this plan on March 31, 1968.
......Biafran intelligence .....got wind of the move and a
Major Jonathan Uchendu was charged with working out a counter-attack strategy.
With a 700-man team, a counter- attack plan was hatched that essentially sealed
up the Abagana Road while the troops lie in ambush in a nearby bush waiting
patiently for the advancing Nigerians and their reinforcements.
Achebe writes that “Major Uchendu’s strategy proved to be
highly successful. His troops destroyed Muhammed’s entire convoy within one and
half hours.” It was probably the most resounding battle ever won by the
Biafrans in the entire war."
MEMOIRS OF DODAN BARRACKS.
Siollun on the 3rd page of his 2013 other work:
"Soldiers of Fortune Nigerian Politics from Buhari to Babangida"
wrote:
"The 1966 cadre created successive dynastic military
regimes for the next 32 years. The young non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and
lieutenants who blasted Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi from power in 1966 became
the colonels who ousted his successor General Gowon in 1975, and they became
the Brigadiers and Major-Generals who overthrew President Shagari in 1983.
These officers included Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha, Muhammadu Buhari, Shehu
Musa Yar'Adua, Aliyu Mohammed, Joshua Dogonyaro, Jerry Useni and Ibrahim
Bako."
It was the place where the Colonels who overthrew Gowon,
sought and attempted the same principle of "in office but not in
power" on Murtala.
It was the place Sagari chose to governor from, the location
where the senior army officers; whose Commander-in-Chief he was sent him a note
that amounted to in office but not in power. The details of all these are
provided.
SHAGARI "IN" THE HOT SEAT
Max Siollun in another book he titled:
"Soldiers of Fortune Nigerian Politics from Buhari to
Babangida 1983-1993" wrote the following on the 7th page of the 2013
Cassava published book, the following:
"Some senior military officers drafted a list of
government ministers they wanted President Shagari to remove, and nominated
their preferred replacements. They delegated their boss, Lt-General Wushishi,
to submit the list to Shagari on their behalf"
Shagari ruled from Dodan Barracks, he was
Commander-in-Chief, yet those over whom he was Commander in Chief, were
virtually Commanding their Chief on matters that didn't concern them through a
note sent to him in Dodan Barracks!
STRATEGIC QUESTION: If Awara's victory placed him in
Government house Port Harcourt, would Amaechi like those army officers, present
a list of preferred appointees, the way those officers presented their list to
Shagari in Dodan Barracks?
In a report by Sahara reporters, (whose owner was the
Presidential candidate of the AAC) the same party, under whose logo Akpo Bomba
Yeeh contested for the Governorship of Rivers state with the overt support of
Rotimi Amaechi. Amaechi according to Yeeh insisted:
"First, he must be the one to appoint 90% of all
political office holders, including commissioners, special advisers, chairmen
and members of government boards, agencies and parastatals. "Second, he
must be the one to nominate and produce all the 23 local government counciI
chairmen and other principal officers of the councils. We, that is Engineer
Biokpomabo and my humble self, must consult and take instructions from him on
all financial policy and fiscal matters, as well as the award and payment of
contracts and other financial transactions upon our inauguration as governor
and Deputy Governor of the state." http://saharareporters.com/…/video-aacs-ex-dep-gov-candidat…
THE SEAT OF POWER: In the United States, the seat of power
is the White House, in Great Britain, it is 10 Downing St, Westminster, London.
Before Gowon the residence and office of the leader of the country were
separate. It was Gowon who moved the seat of power to Dodan Barracks.
Within the space of about eight months the official address
of the leader of the Nigerian state changed three times.
Before the January 15 coup, Balewa's ".... official
residence was the house facing the Island Club at Onikan, Lagos. It is now the
Lagos office of the Economic Commission for West Africa......Oftentimes, the
Prime-Minister would ride in his Roll Royce official car to the Cabinet Office
about half-a-kilometer away." https://www.google.com/…/balewa-and-a-christmas-to-reme…/amp.
Ironsi, upon becoming Head of the Federal Military
Government and Supreme Commander, moved out of Flagstaff house (the official
residence of the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian army, 1 Glover Road
Ikoyi) into State house Marina. Gowon moved the seat of power and his residence
to Dodan Barracks, Ikoyi.
MAJOR ABDULMUMINI AMINU'S AUGUST 27, 1985 DODAN BARRACKS
“I must confess that I led that operation. I went to Dodan
Barracks that time in company of two other officers – then Major John Madaki
and Lawan Gwadabe. Three of us went, but specifically I was the one that went
upstairs to bring Buhari,”
https://www.google.com/…/188069-how-we-arrested-buhari-duri…
Question: If Awara had won and fallen out of favour with
Amaechi, would he get the Ngige treatment from Raphael Ige or the Amaechi
treatment from Joseph Mbu (the Rivers State Commissioner of police when Amaechi
was governor), resulting in the reenactment of Abdulmumini Aminu's script?
HOME OF GUARDS WHO BETRAYED THEIR RESPECTIVE PRINCIPALS.
LIEUTENANT SOS ECHENDU'S APRIL 22, 1990 DODAN BARRACKS.
...Dodan Barracks was the place where Lieutenant SOS Echendu
on the night of April 22, 1990 like the two snakes that expelled George weah of
Liberia or Garba Shehu's rats that prevented Buhari from his office, took
temporarily power while General Babangida abandoned office,
"He abandoned Dodan Barracks to me. I was in control of
Nigeria’s seat of government. I was in charge of Dodan Barracks for that brief
period. He ran away. Go ask him where he was. As at the time I was in control
of Dodan Barracks, he was not there."Lt. SOS Echendu http://saharareporters.com/2014/10/25/“why-i-did-not-kill-president-babangida-during-orkar-coup”-lt-echendu.
MAJOR DONATUS OKAFOR AND CAPTAIN JOE GARBA'S DODAN BARRACKS
Mention has been made of Echendu. It was the headquarters of
Federal Guards who conspired to remove their respective principals they were to
protect.
First it was Major Donatus Okafor, the guards commander who
betrayed Balewa. Renamed national guards by Ironsi under the command Major
Ochie, it reverted to Federal guards under Gowon.
Captain Joe Garba was the officer from Dodan barracks
involved in the over throw of Ironsi and Gowon. First as an officer, from
there, he acted against Ironsi, then as Gowon's guards commander, it was he
that broadcast Gowon's overthrow!
Observation: It was under Decree No 34 of 24th May 1966,
that Ironsi moved Nigeria from a Federation to the Unitary state it has
remained.
That change reflected in the designation of the Federal
guards under Major Ben Ochei, whose name was changed to national guards, just
as the designation of Ironsi's government was changed from Federal Military
Government to National Military Government, as the name of the country (under Ironsi)
was changed from Federal Republic of Nigeria to Republic of Nigeria.
Observation: "Decree No. 2 (May 24) and Decree No. 5 of
1966 (Constitutions Suspension and Modification) Abolished federalism but only
lasted a short time under Ironsi. Renamed the federation the “Republic of
Nigeria.” The Federal Military Government became the “National Military
Government” and the Federal Executive Council became the “Executive Council.”
Each region became a “group of provinces.”
http://carllevan.com/data/nigerias-military-decrees/
Those changes to structure of the Nigerian state, added to
the lopsided Killings and the delay in justice against the January coup ploters
were responsible for Joe Garba's actions.
"CRITICAL SUPPORT NETWORK"
On the 122nd page of the same book, Siollun talked about the
absence of a critical support network, as the basis for which Ogundipe could
assume power. He wrote:
"Even if he had taken a firmer stand, Ogundipe did not
have a "critical support network" in the army as there were very few
Yoruba soldiers"
By critical support network, Siollun meant the strength of
influential number. This was Murtala's main advantage. He had critical support
network across the country with which he could carry out the coup.
When the colonels who overthrew Gowon were planning they
needed T. Y. Danjuma's critical Support network, so they informed him in Jos.
Danjuma's position was clearly attested to by Lindsay
Barrett in his biography on Danjuma.
Siollun added on the 14th page of his book:
"Soldiers of Fortune", the following:
"One of the plotters, Mustapha Jokolo, later revealed
that the former Chief of Army Staff Lt-General Danjuma (retired) was also
briefed about the plot against Shagari: "We told him [Danjuma] of our
plans to overthrow Shagari and he lent us his support in the papers"
Observation: on two occasions T.Y. Danjuma regarded as the
most influential and respected officer to command the army, (by the evidence of
General M. C. Alli who served under him and eventually became the ranking
officer of the army) gave his critical support network to a coup.
Observation: second was through the newspapers which was the
best way of telling his "critical Support network" that he was in
support of the coup.
Observation: Danjuma was in service when he gave his
critical support network to the coup that removed Gowon.... He simply refused
to act. Out of service, the media was the only way of communicating his support
for the removal of Shagari.
Observation: General M. C. Alli on the 60th page of his 396
paged, 2001 Malthouse published book he titled: "The Federal Republic of
the Nigerian Army, The Siege of a Nation" wrote:
"General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma. He is the soldier
who Rose to become the epitome and custodian of the highest ethics and values
of the military profession. He is generally acclaimed as the motivator of our
modern military traditions"
Observation: Danjuma's fallout with Buhari is a strategic
confirmation of documented expansionism.
Observation: Critical Support Network and Contemporary
Politics
Applied to politics, the main difference between the PDP and
APC on one hand, and the other parties on the other is critical Support network
on a national scale. The strategic reason why the AAC lost in Rivers State is
that the PDP has a formidable critical Support network, that even the army
assisted rigging could not assist the AAC with no critical support network,
that leveraged on that of the APC that was pulverized into two main factions of
Amaechi and Abe and a sequence of recurring losses in the court.
"CRITICAL SUPPORT NETWORK" FROM OBASANJO TO BUHARI
Buhari by his lopsided appointments and recruitments, is
restoring the "critical support network" on which "IN OFFICE BUT
NOT IN POWER" THRIVES.
Obasanjo dismantled it in 1999, the Nation reported,
Obasanjo as saying:
"when I got into office as elected president, I got 93
officers of the armed forces out of the military because they were used to what
is called the chummy chummy life in government house, and if I had left them in
the military they would have been the ones that would have created more
problems for us and our democratic dispensation would not have lasted as it has
"CRITICAL SUPPORT NETWORK" is strategic
explanation for Awara's loss in Rivers State and the failed attempt to use the
army to rig, was an attempt at the establishment of a critical support network.
Continues
GAMJI.COM
Although it is said that practically all northern officers
serving in Lagos, Abeokuta, Ikeja and Ibadan eventually became involved, three
officers formed the innermost circle of the plot to overthrow Major General
Aguiyi …
